Vol. 38 Núm. 1 (2018)
Artículo

Instrumentos, artefactos y contexto

Ricardo Mena
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Publicado 2018-05-01

Palabras clave

  • Vaguedad,
  • Filosofía del lenguaje,
  • Instrumentalismo
  • Vagueness,
  • Philosophy of Language,
  • Instrumentalism

Resumen

Es sumamente difícil modelar el rango de aplicación de predicados vagos relativo a una serie sorites apropiada. En este artículo ofrezco algunos comentarios críticos en contra de una postura interesante que ha recibido poca atención en la literatura. De acuerdo con ella, los cortes precisos que encontramos en modelos semánticos son simplemente artefactos de la teoría, y, como tales, son inofensivos. Al final del artículo discuto una postura contextualista que, no sin sacrificios, podría ser capaz de evadir los problemas relacionados con cortes precisos que otras teorías de la vaguedad poseen.

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