Vol. 38 Núm. 2 (2018)
Artículo

¿Estamos racionalmente obligados a ser eficientes?

Julen Ibarrondo Murguialday
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Publicado 2018-11-01

Palabras clave

  • Racionalidad instrumental,
  • Normatividad de la racionalidad,
  • Requisitos de racionalidad,
  • James Broome
  • Instrumental Rationality,
  • Rational Requirements,
  • Normativity of Rationality,
  • James Broome

Resumen

Ser eficaz a la hora de tomar los medios pertinentes para nuestros fines se ha considerado como uno de los aspectos paradigmáticos de la racionalidad. Sin embargo, reconocer la normatividad de la racionalidad instrumental parece implicar la problemática tesis de que uno debe tomar los medios apropiados para sus fines por el mero hecho de tener estos fines, con independencia de cuán irracionales o inmorales sean. En estas páginas defiendo una concepción de la racionalidad instrumental que permite a un mismo tiempo reconocerla como normativa y afirmar que hay medios que uno no debería tomar aun cuando se proponga fines para los que son pertinentes.

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