Vol. 39 Núm. 1 (2019)
Artículo

¿Por qué la empatía es importante para la moralidad?

Carme Isern-Mas
University of the Balearic Islands
Antoni Gomila
University of the Balearic Islands
Publicado mayo 1, 2019
Palabras clave
  • Competencia moral,
  • Moralidad,
  • Empatía,
  • Simpatía,
  • Juicio moral

Resumen

En este trabajo, nos centramos en los argumentos kantianos de Prinz en “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” (2011), donde niega que la empatía sea necesaria para la moralidad porque no es una de las capacidades requeridas para tener competencia moral. Primero mostramos que incluso aceptando las nociones de Prinz de empatía y de competencia moral, la empatía sigue teniendo un papel en la competencia moral. Segundo, argumentamos que la competencia moral no se reduce al juicio moral. Tercero, criticamos la noción de empatía de Prinz porque es demasiado restrictiva, ya que requiere convergencia emocional. Concluimos que una vez entendidas la moralidad y la empatía, el papel de la empatía en moralidad queda justificado. La moralidad no se reduce al juicio racional, sino que presupone necesariamente preferencias sociales y motivación y sensibilidad para con las demandas intersubjetivas.

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