Vol. 39 Núm. 2 (2019)
Artículo

Cierre causal de lo físico, neurofisiología y causas mentales

Ignacio Cea Jacques
Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos “Juan Ignacio Molina”, Universidad de Talca, Talca, Chile / Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades, Departamento de Filosofía, Santiago, Chile
Publicado noviembre 1, 2019
Palabras clave
  • Argumento Causal,
  • Completitud de la Física,
  • Consciencia,
  • Fisicalismo,
  • Libet

Resumen

En este artículo abordo críticamente la aseveración de David Papineau según la cual la evidencia fisiológica acumulada es suficiente para adoptar razonablemente el Principio del Cierre Causal de lo Físico y la vía negativa, viz. entender físico como no mental, como solución al dilema de Hempel. Comenzaremos restando fuerza a tal afirmación revisando el trabajo de W. Penfield y J. Eccles, dos importantes neurocientíficos y declarados dualistas. No obstante, luego nos centraremos en el trabajo de B. Libet en el que se demostraría que los movimientos voluntarios están realmente determinados por causas enteramente (neuro)fisiológicas, lo cual constituiría una pieza fundamental de evidencia a favor de Papineau. Nuestro análisis mostrará que no se siguen tales conclusiones. Esto tendrá consecuencias negativas para el Cierre Causal de lo Físico y con ello para el Argumento Causal para el Fisicalismo del cual el mencionado principio es premisa clave.

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