Vol. 43 Núm. 2 (2023)
Artículos

¿Es un todo prioritario a sus partes?

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  • Angelo Briones
Angelo Briones
IIF-SADAF-CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e543

Publicado 2023-11-01

Palabras clave

  • Mereología,
  • Dependencia de identidad,
  • Criterio de identidad,
  • Prioridad ontológica
  • Mereology,
  • Identity dependence,
  • Identity criterion,
  • Ontological priority
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

La presente investigación tiene como objetivo principal exponer un problema de coherencia presente en las teorías que plantean que los todos mereológicos son prioritarios a las partes que lo componen. El argumento central consiste en mostrar que la dependencia de identidad que las partes tienen con los todos que componen —que define la prioridad ontológica del todo respecto a sus partes— implica un principio de identidad a partir del cual se puede establecer que los todos, a su vez, dependen para su identidad de sus partes, por lo tanto las partes son ontológicamente prioritarias respecto al todo que componen. Así, la teoría colapsa en un círculo vicioso que atenta contra la noción misma de dependencia de identidad. Por esta razón, la teoría no puede sostener de manera coherente la tesis de que los todos son ontológicamente prioritarios a sus partes.

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