Resumen
This paper examines Rorty's theory of truth in reference to concepts such as "falibilism" and "progress". First, it claims that Rorty mixes inconsistently the pragmatist conception of truth, the Davidsonian thesis that "true" is a primitive and the deflacionist conception of truth. Secondly, it analyses the Rortyan attempt to "reduce" "true" to "warranted assertibility" in order to show that this move is imcompatible with falibilism. It is argued that the distinction between truth and justification is essential to conceiving falibilism. Finally, it is held that Rorty's pragmatism is unable to explain scientific and philosophical progress. Three points in the Rortyan philosophy can be pointed out for that thesis: 1) incommensurability of vocabularies, 2) the idea that there is no reason to think that the beliefs best justified are those which are most likely to be true, 3) the "reduction" of "true" to "warranted assertibility".