Vol. 38 Núm. 2 (2018)

Why the Content of Animal Thought Cannot Be Propositional

Mariela Aguilera
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba - CONICET

Publicado 2018-11-01


In “Steps toward Origins of Propositional Thought”, Burge claims that animals of different species are capable of making deductive inferences. According to Burge, that is why propositional thought is extended beyond the human mind to the minds of other kinds of creatures. But, as I argue here, the inferential capacities of animals do not guarantee a propositional structure. According to my argument, propositional content has predicates that might involve a quantificational structure. And the absence of this structure in animal thought might explain some of the differences with the propositional content of human thought.


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