Notas acerca de Fodor y el carácter innato de nuestros conceptos

Resumen

In his Concepts. Where cognitive Science Went Wrong (1998). Fodor argues for his own conceptual atomism within the framework of the Representational Theory of the Mind. It is usually said that this point of view implies a strong involvement with nativism and this nativism is considered as a serious problem for atomism. Here 1 propose to analyze the nativist implications of his atomism.

Firstly I refer to sorne aspects of Fodor's views on concepts and I anticípate my central thesis: in spite of the usual interpretations according to which he is a supporter of an extreme form of nativism, I argue that in Concepts Fodor modifies his account, abandoning his previous involvement with such a strong form of nativism. lnstead he now argues for a kind of a more modera te and more plausible form of nativism. Secondly, I present what Fodor calls the "the standard argument" and also his strategy deployed in Concepts to block this argument. Finally, I criticize Fodor's nativism as it is argued for in Concepts.