Vol. 41 Núm. 2 (2021)
Sección temática

Précis de Uncut

PDF (English)
  • David Ripley
David Ripley
Philosophy Department, Monash University, Australia
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.462

Publicado 2021-11-01

Palabras clave

  • Paradox,
  • Truth,
  • Vagueness,
  • Validity,
  • Meaning
  • Paradojas,
  • Verdad,
  • Vaguedad,
  • Validez,
  • Significado
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

Uncut es un libro sobre dos tipos de paradojas: paradojas que involucran la noción verdad y otros conceptos similares, como la paradoja del mentiroso, y las paradojas de la vaguedad. Hay muchas formas de entender estas paradojas y son muchos los enigmas que estas generan. Uncut ignora gran parte de esto para concentrarse en un único asunto: ¿tienen nuestras palabras el significado que aparentan tener? Y si es así, ¿cómo es esto posible? Sugiero que nuestras palabras tienen el significado que aparentan tener y sin embargo nuestro lenguaje no se ve afectado por las paradojas. Para mostrar cómo esto es posible, desarrollo una teoría distintiva del significado.

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Citas

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