Artículos
Publicado 2017-11-01
Palabras clave
- Direito Contratual,
- Rawls,
- PrincÃpio da Diferença,
- Etos social
- Contract Law,
- Rawls,
- Difference Principle,
- Social Ethos
- Direito Contratual,
- ; Rawls,
- PrincÃpio da Diferença,
- Etos social
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.
Resumen
O artigo discorre sobre a relação entre o direito contratual e os princípios da teoría da justiça de Rawls, com especial atenção para o princípio da diferença. Parte-se da premissa de que as atitudes dos cidadãos (ou etos social) se sujeitam à influência das instituições. Todo o restante sendo igual, portanto, o princípio da diferença requer instituições que fomentem um etos social o mais igualitário possível. Conclui-se daí que o papel do direito contratual em uma sociedade ideal rawlsiana pode não ser o de promover a eficiência (isto é, beneficiar os cidadãos em pior situação mediante uma regulação eficiente das trocas), mas colaborar para um etos social menos propenso à desigualdade. Afirma-se que o direito contratual pode cumprir esse desiderato de duas maneiras: descritivamente, ao abrir mão da presunção de que os contratantes atuam unicamente para maximizar a própria utilidade (a presunção do homo economicus), e valorativamente, ao enaltecer comportamentos moderadamente altruístas.
Citas
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Wang, L., Malhotra, D. e Murnighan, J. K. (2011), “Economics Education and Greed”, Academy of Management Learning & Education, 10, (4), pp. 643-660.
Zanitelli, L. M. (2015), “Discriminação privada e o segundo princípio da justiça de Rawls”, Kriterion, 132, pp. 393-411.
Zanitelli, L. M. (2016), “Rawls, contratos e Estado de Direito”. Inédito, em arquivo com o autor.
Blumkin, T. e Margalioth, Y. (2006), “On the Limits of Redistributive Taxation: Establishing a Case for Equity-informed Legal Rules”, Virgina Tax Review, 25, pp. 1-29.
Cohen, G. A. (2008), Rescuing Justice and Equality, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Cohen, J. (2001), “Taking People as They Are?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30, pp. 363-386.
De Geest, G. (org.) (2011), Contract Law and Economics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
Engel, C. (2011), “Dictator Games: A Meta Study”, Experimental Economics, 14, pp. 583-610.
Falk, A. e Szech, N. (2013), “Morals and markets”, Science, 340, pp. 707-711.
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. e Fehr, E. (2001), “Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment”, Economics Letters, 71, pp. 397-404.
Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T. e Regan, D. T. (1993), “Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7, pp. 159-171.
Frey, B. S. (1997), “A Constitution for Knaves Crowds out Civic Virtues”, Economic Journal, 107, pp. 1043-1053.
Hadfield, G. K. (2008), “The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments”, em Ménard, C. e Shirley, M. M. (orgs.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Berlim, Springer, pp. 175-203.
Hesselink, M. W. (2011), “Five Political Ideas of European Contract Law”, European Review of Contract Law, 2, pp. 295-313.
Jolls, C. (1998), “Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules”, Vanderbilt Law Review, 51, pp. 1653-1677.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L. e Thaler, R. H. (1986), “Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics”, Journal of Business, 59, pp. 285-300.
Kaplow, L. e Shavell, S. (1994), “Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income”, Journal of Legal Studies, 23, pp. 667-681.
Kennedy, D. (1982), “Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargain Power”, Maryland Law Review, 41, (4), pp. 563-658.
Klijnsma, J. (2015), “Contract Law as Fairness”, Ratio Juris, 28, (1), pp. 68-88.
Kordana, K. A. e Tabachnick, D. H. (2005), “Rawls and Contract Law”, George Washington Law Review, 73, pp. 598-632.
Logue, K. e Avraham, R. (2003), “Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance”, Tax Law Review, 56, pp. 157-258.
Martins-Costa, J. (1999), A boa-fé no direito privado, São Paulo, Revista dos Tribunais.
Miller, D. T. (1999), “The Norm of Self-interest”, American Psychologist, 54, pp. 1053-1060.
Mulder, L. B., Van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D. e Wilke, H. A. M. (2006), “Undermining Trust and Cooperation: The Paradox of Sanctioning Systems in Social Dilemmas”, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, pp. 147-162.
Negreiros, T. (2006), Teoria do Contrato: Novos paradigmas, Rio de Janeiro, Renovar, 2ª ed.
Radin, M. J. (1987), “Market-inalienability”, Harvard Law Review, 100, pp. 1849-1937.
Rawls, J. (1993), Political Liberalism, Nova York, Columbia University Press.
Rawls, J. (1999), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Belknap Press, 2ª ed.
Rawls, J. (2001), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Cambridge, Belknap Press.
Rubin, P. (2008), “Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market Exchanges”, em Ménard, C. e Shirley, M. M. (orgs.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Berlim, Springer, pp. 205-228.
Sanchirico, C. W. (2001), “Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale”, Cornell Law Review, 86, pp. 1003-1089.
Scheffler, S. (2015), “Distributive Justice, the Basic Structure and the Place of Private Law”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 35, pp. 213-235.
Shiffrin, S. V. (2004), “Race, Labor, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle”, Fordham Law Review, 72, pp. 1643-1675.
Sunstein, C. R. (1996), “On the Expressive Function of Law”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 144, pp. 2021-2053.
Trebilcock, M. e Leng, J. (2006), “The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development”, Virginia Law Review, 92, pp. 1517-1580.
Van Der Burg, W. (2001), “The Expressive and Communicative Functions of Law, especially with Regard to Moral Issues”, Law and Philosophy, 20, pp. 31-59.
Van Parijs, P. (2009), “Egalitarian Justice, Left Libertarianism, and the Market”, em De Wijze, S., Kramer, M. H. e Carter, I. (orgs.), Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice: Themes and Challenges, Londres, Routledge, pp. 145-162.
Wang, L., Malhotra, D. e Murnighan, J. K. (2011), “Economics Education and Greed”, Academy of Management Learning & Education, 10, (4), pp. 643-660.
Zanitelli, L. M. (2015), “Discriminação privada e o segundo princípio da justiça de Rawls”, Kriterion, 132, pp. 393-411.
Zanitelli, L. M. (2016), “Rawls, contratos e Estado de Direito”. Inédito, em arquivo com o autor.