Articles
Published 2017-11-01
Keywords
- Direito Contratual,
- Rawls,
- PrincÃpio da Diferença,
- Etos social
- Contract Law,
- Rawls,
- Difference Principle,
- Social Ethos
- Direito Contratual,
- ; Rawls,
- PrincÃpio da Diferença,
- Etos social
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Abstract
The paper addresses the relationship between contract law and Rawls’s theory of justice (particularly, the difference principle). It assumes that institutions can influence citizens’ attitudes (or social ethos). Thus, all rest being the same, the difference principle requires that, to the greatest possible extent, institutions favor an egalitarian ethos. This leads to the conclusion that the role of contract law in an ideal Rawlsian society may be other than promoting an efficient regulation of economic exchange. Contract law can switch citizens’ egoistic attitudes in two discursive ways: by doing away with the assumption that agents are interested only in maximizing their own utility (the homo economicus assumption) and praising the value of moderately altruist behavior.
References
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Zanitelli, L. M. (2016), “Rawls, contratos e Estado de Direito”. Inédito, em arquivo com o autor.
Blumkin, T. e Margalioth, Y. (2006), “On the Limits of Redistributive Taxation: Establishing a Case for Equity-informed Legal Rules”, Virgina Tax Review, 25, pp. 1-29.
Cohen, G. A. (2008), Rescuing Justice and Equality, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Cohen, J. (2001), “Taking People as They Are?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30, pp. 363-386.
De Geest, G. (org.) (2011), Contract Law and Economics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
Engel, C. (2011), “Dictator Games: A Meta Study”, Experimental Economics, 14, pp. 583-610.
Falk, A. e Szech, N. (2013), “Morals and markets”, Science, 340, pp. 707-711.
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. e Fehr, E. (2001), “Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment”, Economics Letters, 71, pp. 397-404.
Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T. e Regan, D. T. (1993), “Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7, pp. 159-171.
Frey, B. S. (1997), “A Constitution for Knaves Crowds out Civic Virtues”, Economic Journal, 107, pp. 1043-1053.
Hadfield, G. K. (2008), “The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments”, em Ménard, C. e Shirley, M. M. (orgs.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Berlim, Springer, pp. 175-203.
Hesselink, M. W. (2011), “Five Political Ideas of European Contract Law”, European Review of Contract Law, 2, pp. 295-313.
Jolls, C. (1998), “Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules”, Vanderbilt Law Review, 51, pp. 1653-1677.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L. e Thaler, R. H. (1986), “Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics”, Journal of Business, 59, pp. 285-300.
Kaplow, L. e Shavell, S. (1994), “Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income”, Journal of Legal Studies, 23, pp. 667-681.
Kennedy, D. (1982), “Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargain Power”, Maryland Law Review, 41, (4), pp. 563-658.
Klijnsma, J. (2015), “Contract Law as Fairness”, Ratio Juris, 28, (1), pp. 68-88.
Kordana, K. A. e Tabachnick, D. H. (2005), “Rawls and Contract Law”, George Washington Law Review, 73, pp. 598-632.
Logue, K. e Avraham, R. (2003), “Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance”, Tax Law Review, 56, pp. 157-258.
Martins-Costa, J. (1999), A boa-fé no direito privado, São Paulo, Revista dos Tribunais.
Miller, D. T. (1999), “The Norm of Self-interest”, American Psychologist, 54, pp. 1053-1060.
Mulder, L. B., Van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D. e Wilke, H. A. M. (2006), “Undermining Trust and Cooperation: The Paradox of Sanctioning Systems in Social Dilemmas”, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, pp. 147-162.
Negreiros, T. (2006), Teoria do Contrato: Novos paradigmas, Rio de Janeiro, Renovar, 2ª ed.
Radin, M. J. (1987), “Market-inalienability”, Harvard Law Review, 100, pp. 1849-1937.
Rawls, J. (1993), Political Liberalism, Nova York, Columbia University Press.
Rawls, J. (1999), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Belknap Press, 2ª ed.
Rawls, J. (2001), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Cambridge, Belknap Press.
Rubin, P. (2008), “Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market Exchanges”, em Ménard, C. e Shirley, M. M. (orgs.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Berlim, Springer, pp. 205-228.
Sanchirico, C. W. (2001), “Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale”, Cornell Law Review, 86, pp. 1003-1089.
Scheffler, S. (2015), “Distributive Justice, the Basic Structure and the Place of Private Law”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 35, pp. 213-235.
Shiffrin, S. V. (2004), “Race, Labor, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle”, Fordham Law Review, 72, pp. 1643-1675.
Sunstein, C. R. (1996), “On the Expressive Function of Law”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 144, pp. 2021-2053.
Trebilcock, M. e Leng, J. (2006), “The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development”, Virginia Law Review, 92, pp. 1517-1580.
Van Der Burg, W. (2001), “The Expressive and Communicative Functions of Law, especially with Regard to Moral Issues”, Law and Philosophy, 20, pp. 31-59.
Van Parijs, P. (2009), “Egalitarian Justice, Left Libertarianism, and the Market”, em De Wijze, S., Kramer, M. H. e Carter, I. (orgs.), Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice: Themes and Challenges, Londres, Routledge, pp. 145-162.
Wang, L., Malhotra, D. e Murnighan, J. K. (2011), “Economics Education and Greed”, Academy of Management Learning & Education, 10, (4), pp. 643-660.
Zanitelli, L. M. (2015), “Discriminação privada e o segundo princípio da justiça de Rawls”, Kriterion, 132, pp. 393-411.
Zanitelli, L. M. (2016), “Rawls, contratos e Estado de Direito”. Inédito, em arquivo com o autor.