Vol. 40 No. Especial (2020): Lógica, lenguaje y representación. Homenaje a Alberto Moretti
Articles

On Carroll's Regress, Conventionalism and the Foundations of Logic

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  • Mario Gomez Torrente
Mario Gomez Torrente
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Ciudad de México, México
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.429

Published 2020-12-15

Keywords

  • Conventionalism,
  • Adoption of rules,
  • Rule-following,
  • Inferentialism
  • Convencionalismo,
  • Adopción de reglas,
  • Seguimiento de reglas,
  • Inferencialismo
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Abstract

I propose that Quine’s Carrollian argument in “Truth by Convention” does not refute an especially genuine variety of conventionalism about logic. I also argue that the basic Carrollian lesson about conventionalism is that the introduction of accepted conventions or theses about what is logically correct cannot by itself create the corresponding inferential dispositions. Based on my discussion of the Carrollian regress, I finally indicate that there are at least certain Carrollian limits to the way in which the “logical laws” could be “replaced” and, contrary to some of Alberto Moretti’s considerations, that there are also other not strictly Carrollian limits to the replaceability of logical laws.

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