v. 32 n. 1 (2012)
Simpósio

Response to my Critics

PDF (English)
  • Roy T. Cook
Roy T. Cook
University of Minnesotta
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2012.111

Publicado 2012-05-01

Creative Commons License

Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

During the Winter of 2011 I visited SADAF and gave a series of talks based on the central chapters of my manuscript on the Yablo paradox. The following year, I visited again, and was pleased and honored to find out that Eduardo Barrio and six of his students had written ‘responses’ that addressed the claims and arguments found in the manuscript, as well as explored new directions in which to take the ideas and themes found there. These comments reflect my thoughts on these responses (also collected in this issue), as well as my thoughts on further issues that arose during the symposium that was based on the papers and during the many hours I spent talking and working with Eduardo and his students.

PDF (English)

Referências

  1. Cogburn, J. and Cook, R. (2000), “What negation is not: intuitionism and ‘0 = 1’”, Analysis, 60, pp. 5-12.
  2. Cook, R. (2002), “Vagueness and mathematical precision”, Mind, 111, pp. 225-247.
  3. Cook, R. (2005),“Intuitionism reconsidered”, in Shapiro, S. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 387-411.
  4. Cook, R. (2008), “Embracing revenge: on the indefinite extensibility oflanguage”, in Beall, JC. (ed.), Revenge of the Liar, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 31-52.
  5. Cook, R. (2009a), “What is a Truth value, and How many are There?”, Studia Logica, 92, pp. 183-201.
  6. Cook, R. (2009b) “New waves on an old beach: Fregean philosophy of mathematics today”, in Linnebo, O. and Bueno, O. (eds.) (2009), New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics, Surrey, UK, Ashgate, pp. 13-34.
  7. Cook, R. (2011) “Vagueness and meaning theories”, in Ronzitti, G. (ed.), Vagueness: A Guide, Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science, vol 19, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 83-106.
  8. Cook, R. (2012), “Conservativeness, Stability, and abstraction”, British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 63, pp. 673-696.
  9. Cook, R. (forthcoming-a), The Yablo Paradox: An Essay on Circularity, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  10. Cook, R. (forthcoming-b) “Should antirealists be antirealists about antirealism?”, Erkenntnis.
  11. Rieger, A. (2000), “An argument for Finsler-Aczel Set Theory”, Mind,109, pp. 241-253.