Resumo
One of the main arguments in favor of metalinguistic predicativism is the uniformity argument. The article discusses one of its premises, according to which the Being Called Condition gives the literal meaning of proper names. First, the uniformity argument is presented. Second, the article examines a challenge by Jeshion (2015a) and a recent response by Tayebi (2018). It is then argued that Tayebi’s response is unsound. Finally, two sets of facts are discussed, which provide independent evidence against the literal meaning thesis.
Referências
Boër, S. E. (1975), “Proper Names as Predicates”, Philosophical Studies, 27 (6), pp. 389-400.
Borer, H. (2005), In Name Only. Vol. 1 of Structuring Sense, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Burge, T. (1973), “Reference and Proper Names”, The Journal of Philosophy, 70 (14), pp. 425-439.
Cumming, S. (2008), “Variabilism”, Philosophical Review, 117 (4), pp. 525-554.
Elbourne, P. (2002), Situations and Individuals, Boston, Massachusetts, PhD. Dissertation, MIT.
Fara, D. G. (2011), “You can call me “stupid”… just don’t call me stupid”, Analysis, 71, pp. 492-501.
Fara, D. G. (2015a), “Names are Predicates”, Philosophical Review, 124 (1), pp. 59-117.
Fara, D. G. (2015b), “‘Literal’ Uses of Proper Names” in Bianchi, A. (ed.) On Reference, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 251-279.
García-Carpintero, M. (2017), “The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names”, Mind, 127 (508), pp. 1107-1168.
Geurts, B. (1997), “Good News about the Description Theory of Names”, Journal of Semantics, 14 (4), pp. 319-348.
Gray, A. (2017), “Names in Strange Places”, Linguistics and Philosophy, 40 (5), pp. 429-472.
Hinzen, W. (2016), “Linguistic Evidence against Predicativism”, Philosophy Compass, 11 (10), pp. 591-608.
Hornsby, J. (1976), “Proper Names: A Defence of Burge”, Philosophical Studies 30 (4), pp. 227-234.
Jeshion, R. (2015a), “Referentialism and Predicativism about Proper Names”, Erkenntnis, 80 (2), pp. 363-404.
Jeshion, R. (2015b), “Names not Predicates”, in Biachi, A. (ed.), On reference, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 223-248.
Jeshion, R. (2017), “’The’ Problem for the-Predicativism”, The Philosophical Review, 126 (2), pp. 219-240.
Kaplan, D. (1989), “Demonstratives”, in Almog, J., Perry, J. y Wettstein, H. (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 481-563.
Kneale, W. (1962), “Modality de dicto and de re”, in Nagel, E., Suppes, P. y Tarski, A. (eds.), Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, pp. 622-633.
Korta, K. and Perry, J. (2011), Critical Pragmatics: An Inquiry into Reference and Communication, New York, Cambridge University Press.
Kripke, S. (1980), Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press.
Leckie, G. (2013), “The Double Life of Names”, Philosophical Studies, 165 (3), pp. 1139-1160.
Matushansky, O. (2006), “Why Rose is the Rose: On the Use of Definite Articles in Proper Names”, Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics, 6, pp. 285-307.
Matushansky, O. (2008), “On the Linguistic Complexity of Proper Names”, Linguistics and Philosophy, 31, pp. 573-627.
Matushansky, O. (2015), “The Other Francis Bacon: On Non-BARE Proper Names”, Erkenntnis, 80 (2), pp. 335-362.
Nunberg, G. (1995), “Transfers of Meaning”, Journal of Semantics, 12 (2), pp. 109-132.
Nunberg, G. (2004), “The Pragmatics of Deferred Interpretation”, in Horn, L. and Ward, G. (eds.), Blackwell Encyclopedia of Pragmatics, pp. 344-364.
Pelczar, M. and Rainsbury, J. (1998), “The Indexical Character of Names”, Synthese, 114 (2), pp. 293-317.
Predelli, S. (2005), Contexts: Meaning, Truth, and the Use of Language, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Predelli, S.(2015), “Who’s Afraid of the Predicate Theory of Names?” Linguistics and Philosophy, 38 (4), pp. 363-376.
Recanati, F. (1993), Direct Reference: From Language to Thought, Blackwell.
Rothschild, D. (2007), “The Elusive Scope of Descriptions”, Philosophy Compass, 2 (6), pp. 910-927.
Saab, A. and Lo Guercio, N. (2018), “No Name: The Allosemy View”, Studia Linguistica. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1111/stul.12116.
Sainsbury, R. M. (2005), Reference without Referents, New York, Oxford University Press.
Salmon, N. U. (1986), Frege’s Puzzle, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Sawyer, S. (2010), “The Modified Predicate Theory of Proper Names”, in Sawyer, S. (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 206-226.
Schoubye, A. J. (2016), “Type-ambiguous Names”, Mind, 126 (503), pp. 715-767.
Schwartz, F. (2009), Two Types of Definites in Natural Language, Boston, Massachusetts, Ph.D. thesis, University of Massachusetts Amherst.
Sloat, C. (1969), “Proper Nouns in English”, Language, 45 (1), pp. 26-30.
Tayebi, S. (2018), “In Defense of the Unification Argument for Predicativism”, Linguistics and Philosophy, 41 (5), pp 557-576.
Borer, H. (2005), In Name Only. Vol. 1 of Structuring Sense, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Burge, T. (1973), “Reference and Proper Names”, The Journal of Philosophy, 70 (14), pp. 425-439.
Cumming, S. (2008), “Variabilism”, Philosophical Review, 117 (4), pp. 525-554.
Elbourne, P. (2002), Situations and Individuals, Boston, Massachusetts, PhD. Dissertation, MIT.
Fara, D. G. (2011), “You can call me “stupid”… just don’t call me stupid”, Analysis, 71, pp. 492-501.
Fara, D. G. (2015a), “Names are Predicates”, Philosophical Review, 124 (1), pp. 59-117.
Fara, D. G. (2015b), “‘Literal’ Uses of Proper Names” in Bianchi, A. (ed.) On Reference, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 251-279.
García-Carpintero, M. (2017), “The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names”, Mind, 127 (508), pp. 1107-1168.
Geurts, B. (1997), “Good News about the Description Theory of Names”, Journal of Semantics, 14 (4), pp. 319-348.
Gray, A. (2017), “Names in Strange Places”, Linguistics and Philosophy, 40 (5), pp. 429-472.
Hinzen, W. (2016), “Linguistic Evidence against Predicativism”, Philosophy Compass, 11 (10), pp. 591-608.
Hornsby, J. (1976), “Proper Names: A Defence of Burge”, Philosophical Studies 30 (4), pp. 227-234.
Jeshion, R. (2015a), “Referentialism and Predicativism about Proper Names”, Erkenntnis, 80 (2), pp. 363-404.
Jeshion, R. (2015b), “Names not Predicates”, in Biachi, A. (ed.), On reference, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 223-248.
Jeshion, R. (2017), “’The’ Problem for the-Predicativism”, The Philosophical Review, 126 (2), pp. 219-240.
Kaplan, D. (1989), “Demonstratives”, in Almog, J., Perry, J. y Wettstein, H. (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 481-563.
Kneale, W. (1962), “Modality de dicto and de re”, in Nagel, E., Suppes, P. y Tarski, A. (eds.), Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, pp. 622-633.
Korta, K. and Perry, J. (2011), Critical Pragmatics: An Inquiry into Reference and Communication, New York, Cambridge University Press.
Kripke, S. (1980), Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press.
Leckie, G. (2013), “The Double Life of Names”, Philosophical Studies, 165 (3), pp. 1139-1160.
Matushansky, O. (2006), “Why Rose is the Rose: On the Use of Definite Articles in Proper Names”, Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics, 6, pp. 285-307.
Matushansky, O. (2008), “On the Linguistic Complexity of Proper Names”, Linguistics and Philosophy, 31, pp. 573-627.
Matushansky, O. (2015), “The Other Francis Bacon: On Non-BARE Proper Names”, Erkenntnis, 80 (2), pp. 335-362.
Nunberg, G. (1995), “Transfers of Meaning”, Journal of Semantics, 12 (2), pp. 109-132.
Nunberg, G. (2004), “The Pragmatics of Deferred Interpretation”, in Horn, L. and Ward, G. (eds.), Blackwell Encyclopedia of Pragmatics, pp. 344-364.
Pelczar, M. and Rainsbury, J. (1998), “The Indexical Character of Names”, Synthese, 114 (2), pp. 293-317.
Predelli, S. (2005), Contexts: Meaning, Truth, and the Use of Language, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Predelli, S.(2015), “Who’s Afraid of the Predicate Theory of Names?” Linguistics and Philosophy, 38 (4), pp. 363-376.
Recanati, F. (1993), Direct Reference: From Language to Thought, Blackwell.
Rothschild, D. (2007), “The Elusive Scope of Descriptions”, Philosophy Compass, 2 (6), pp. 910-927.
Saab, A. and Lo Guercio, N. (2018), “No Name: The Allosemy View”, Studia Linguistica. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1111/stul.12116.
Sainsbury, R. M. (2005), Reference without Referents, New York, Oxford University Press.
Salmon, N. U. (1986), Frege’s Puzzle, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Sawyer, S. (2010), “The Modified Predicate Theory of Proper Names”, in Sawyer, S. (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 206-226.
Schoubye, A. J. (2016), “Type-ambiguous Names”, Mind, 126 (503), pp. 715-767.
Schwartz, F. (2009), Two Types of Definites in Natural Language, Boston, Massachusetts, Ph.D. thesis, University of Massachusetts Amherst.
Sloat, C. (1969), “Proper Nouns in English”, Language, 45 (1), pp. 26-30.
Tayebi, S. (2018), “In Defense of the Unification Argument for Predicativism”, Linguistics and Philosophy, 41 (5), pp 557-576.