v. 41 n. 2 (2021)
Seção temática

Inferentialism and Relevance: The case of Connexivity

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  • Damián Szmuc
Damián Szmuc
IIF -SADAF - CONICET / Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.458

Publicado 2021-11-01

Creative Commons License

Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

This paper provides an inferentialist motivation for a logic belonging in the connexive family, by borrowing elements from the bilateralist interpretation for Classical Logic without the Cut rule, proposed by David Ripley. The paper focuses on the relation between inferentialism and relevance, through the exploration of what we call relevant assertion and denial, showing that a connexive system emerges as a symptom of this interesting link. With the present attempt we hope to broaden the available interpretations for connexive logics, showing they can be rightfully motivated in terms of certain relevantist constraints imposed on assertion and denial.

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