Publicado 2021-11-01
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Resumo
The present note investigates the connection between nonreflexive and nontransitive logics from a bounds-theoretic perspective. What will emerge is one way in which, if we focus on the ways in which strict and tolerant acts constrain one another, nonreflexive and nontransitive notions of consequence can be seen as simply reflecting different aspects of the same underlying reality.
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