v. 19 n. 1 (1999)
Artigos

Inconmensurabilidad y neutralidad teórica: algunas contribuciones actuales

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  • Nélida Gentile
Nélida Gentile
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e581

Publicado 1999-05-01

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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

In the early 80's the problem of incommensurability was reavived around of semantic holism versus causal realism discussion. In "Observation Reconsidered", Jerry Fodor argues -against Hanson, Kuhn and Feyerabend- the neutral character of perception judgments. Four years after Churchland writes "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: a Reply to Jerry Fodor". The objections are examined and answered again by Fodor in "A Reply To Churchland's 'Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality"'. In this paper I analyze the more relevan! aspects of this dispute and attempt to show the scarcity ofthe evidence available to solve the question. In a final section, however, I examine the conception holded by Michael Bishop that, in rny opinion, represents an interesting perspective in support for the Fodor's conclusions.

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Referências

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