Publicado 2026-09-24
Palabras clave
- Intuiciones,
- Evidencia,
- Centralidad,
- Objeción de la Caracterización Errónea,
- Argumento Abductivo
- Intuitions,
- Evidence,
- Centrality,
- Mischaracterization Objection,
- Abductive Argument
Cómo citar

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.
Resumen
Este artículo ofrece una defensa abductiva de Centralidad, la tesis de que las intuiciones se utilizan como evidencia o como fuente de evidencia dentro del método de casos. Se argumenta que Centralidad proporciona una mejor explicación para características clave de la práctica filosófica que su principal rival, la Objeción de la Caracterización Errónea (MISC+), la cual sostiene que los filósofos se basan en argumentos, y no en intuiciones, para sus veredictos sobre experimentos mentales. La primera sección introduce el debate y clarifica las posiciones en competencia. La segunda sección desarrolla un modelo “fuente-contenido” de Centralidad, definiendo las intuiciones como pareceres intelectuales no inferenciales que otorgan un estatus evidencial prima facie a su contenido proposicional. La tercera y última sección presenta el argumento abductivo principal. Este sostiene que Centralidad ofrece una explicación superior para dos prácticas esenciales del método de casos: por un lado, la fuerza inmediata de los contraejemplos tipo Gettier; por el otro, la práctica de “morder la bala” al aceptar una conclusión contraintuitiva y ofrecer una correspondiente “teoría del error”, como sucede con el rechazo de Nozick al Principio de Clausura. El artículo concluye que, debido a que Centralidad ofrece una explicación más parsimoniosa y con mayor poder explicativo para estas prácticas filosóficas, es la metateoría superior.
Citas
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