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Intuitions as Evidence: An Abductive Defense of Centrality

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  • Joel Alejandro Franco Ramírez
Joel Alejandro Franco Ramírez
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Ciudad de México, México
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1324

Publicado 2026-09-24

Como Citar

Franco Ramírez, J. A. (2026). Intuitions as Evidence: An Abductive Defense of Centrality. Análisis Filosófico. https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1324
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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

This paper offers an abductive defense of Centrality, the thesis that intuitions are used as evidence or as a source of evidence within the method of cases. It is argued that Centrality provides a better explanation for key features of philosophical practice than its main rival, the Mischaracterization Objection (MISC+), which contends that philosophers rely on arguments, not intuitions, for their verdicts about thought experiments. The first section introduces the debate and clarifies the competing positions. The second section develops a source-content model of Centrality, defining intuitions as non-inferential intellectual seemings that grant prima facie evidential status to their propositional content. The third and final section presents the main abductive argument. It holds that Centrality offers a superior explanation for two essential practices of the method of cases: on the one hand, the immediate dialectical force of Gettier-style counterexamples; on the other, the practice of “biting the bullet” by accepting a counterintuitive conclusion and offering a corresponding error theory, as exemplified by Nozick’s rejection of the Closure Principle. The paper concludes that because Centrality offers a more parsimonious and explanatorily powerful account of these philosophical practices, it stands as the superior metatheory.

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