Vol. 39 Núm. 1 (2019)

Sobre el significado literal de los nombres propios

Nicolás Lo Guercio

Publicado 2019-05-01

Palabras clave

  • Semantics,
  • Predicativism,
  • Uniformity Argument
  • Semántica,
  • Predicativismo,
  • Argumento de la uniformidad


Uno de los principales argumentos en favor del predicativismo metalingüístico es el argumento de la uniformidad. El artículo discute una de sus premisas, de acuerdo con la cual la ‘Being Called Condition’ proporciona el significado literal de los nombres propios. En primer lugar, se presenta el argumento de la uniformidad. En segundo lugar, se discute el desafío lanzado por Jeshion (2015a) así como la respuesta proporcionada por Tayebi (2018). Se argumenta luego que la respuesta de Tayebi falla. Finalmente, se presentan dos evidencias independientes contra la tesis del significado literal.


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