Vol. 43 Núm. 1 (2023)
Artículos

La significancia de los casos idealizados de desacuerdo

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  • Jorge Prado
Jorge Prado
Universidad de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2023.442

Publicado 2023-05-01

Palabras clave

  • Desacuerdo,
  • Casos idealizados de desacuerdo,
  • Equivalencia epistémica,
  • Aceptación,
  • Creencia
  • Disagreement,
  • Idealized Cases of Disagreement,
  • Epistemic Equivalence,
  • Acceptance,
  • Belief
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

Defenderé que es necesario derrotar los argumentos de la primacía de la perspectiva de la primera persona en la epistemología del desacuerdo si se quiere preservar la equivalencia epistémica requerida para evaluar apropiadamente el disenso entre pares. Lo anterior involucra argumentar por qué estos argumentos quiebran dicha equivalencia. En segundo lugar, justificaré la relevancia de esta simetría para el análisis epistemológico del desacuerdo. En tercer lugar, argumentaré que preservar la equivalencia epistémica en casos idealizados de desacuerdo no implica adoptar necesariamente una postura conciliacionista, pues es posible formular una postura no conformista sin quebrar dicha equivalencia a partir de la distinción entre aceptación y creencia.

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Citas

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