Vol. 43 No. 1 (2023)
Articles

The Significance of Idealized Cases of Disagreement

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  • Jorge Prado
Jorge Prado
Universidad de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2023.442

Published 2023-05-01

Keywords

  • Desacuerdo,
  • Casos idealizados de desacuerdo,
  • Equivalencia epistémica,
  • Aceptación,
  • Creencia
  • Disagreement,
  • Idealized Cases of Disagreement,
  • Epistemic Equivalence,
  • Acceptance,
  • Belief
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Abstract

I will defend that it is necessary to defeat first-person perspective primacy arguments within the epistemology of disagreement to preserve the required epistemic equivalence for assessing appropriately dispute between pairs. The latter implies to argue why these arguments undermine the aforementioned equivalence. Secondly, I will justify the relevance of this symmetry for the epistemological analysis of disagreement. Thirdly, I will argue that maintaining the epistemic equivalence in idealized cases of disagreement does not imply a conciliationist stance since it is possible to propose a non-conformist approach without undermining symmetry by distinguishing acceptance and belief.

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