Vol. 34 Núm. 2 (2014)

¿Puede el conocimiento ser un estado mental?

Florencia Rimoldi
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina - CONICET

Publicado 2014-11-01

Palabras clave

  • Factividad,
  • Clases naturales,
  • Actitudes,
  • Acción
  • Factiveness,
  • Natural Types,
  • Attitudes,
  • Action


En Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argumenta a favor de la tesis fuerte de que el conocimiento es un estado mental (CEMf), ofreciendo una caracterización del conocimiento según la cual es "la actitudfactiva estativa más general". Dicha caracterización es central una vez que se considera que los estados perceptivos son también actitudes factivas estativas. Esta propuesta ha sido discutida ampliamente en la literatura. En este trabajo argumento en contra de (CEMf) a partir de una crítica novedosa que parte de las herramientas mismas que Williamson usa a su favor. Para ello argumentaré, en distintas etapas, que los estados perceptivos no son actitudes factivas estativas. La crítica en cuestión no se limita a mostrar la falsedad de la caracterización del conocimiento en términos de actitudes factivas estativas, sino que también muestra la implausibilidad de (CEMf).


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