Published 2024-11-08
Keywords
- Axiology,
- Population Ethics,
- Incommensurability,
- Lexicality,
- Totalism
- AxiologÃa,
- Ética de poblaciones,
- Inconmensurabilidad,
- Lexicalidad,
- Totalismo
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Abstract
In population ethics, some appeal to certain lexical and critical level total views to avoid the repugnant conclusion. Since the very repugnant conclusion is a weaker adequacy condition, we may think that these views will also allow us to avoid this conclusion. In this paper I argue that this is not the case. First, I show that the idea that some popular lexical total views could allow us to avoid the very repugnant conclusion is mistaken. Then I demonstrate that the same is true of critical range total views. Finally, I clarify which views allow us to avoid this conclusion.
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