Vol. 44 No. 2 (2024)
Critical Notes

Comesaña's Experientialism: About Being Rational and Being Right by Juan Comesaña

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  • Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas
Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1021

Published 2024-11-08

Keywords

  • Experientialism,
  • Factualism,
  • Psychologism,
  • Basic Justification,
  • Epistemic Liberalism, and Conservatism
  • Experiencialismo,
  • Factualismo,
  • Psicologismo,
  • Justificación básica,
  • Liberalismo y conservadurismo epistémicos
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Abstract

This critical appraisal of Juan Comesaña’s Being Rational and Being Right is divided into three sections: Section I describes the fundamental features of “Experientialism,” the theory of basic rationality developed and defended in the book; Section II briefly indicates how the chapters of the book unfold; and Section III describes and examines one problematic issue concerning how Experientialism interacts with the liberalism/conservatism debate in the theory of justification.

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References

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