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The Normative Value of Truth in Linguistic Practice and in the Technological Transformation of Communication according to Brandom’s Theory of Language

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  • Javier Jara Leyton
Javier Jara Leyton
Universidad de Santiago de Chile, Santiago, Chile
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1091

Published 2024-11-06

Keywords

  • Inferencialismo,
  • Pragmatismo lingüístico,
  • Normatividad,
  • Inteligencia artificial generativa,
  • Servicios de redes sociales
  • Inferentialism,
  • Linguistic Pragmatism,
  • Normativity,
  • Generative Artificial Intelligence,
  • Social Networking Services
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Abstract

Robert Brandom’s theory of discursive practice regards all linguistic activity as taking place within a social normative framework. The normative structure of this framework is described by means of an ideal model of linguistic game: the game of giving and asking for reasons. The main elements of this model account for the fundamental relations that characterise linguistic practice: responsibility and authority. Although the semantic development of the theory is inferentialist and hence deflationist about truth, it is useful to use this concept to distinguish an elementary precondition for discursive practice. On the basis of this conceptual expedient, it is possible to analyse the transformation of such practice induced by the emergence of social networking services with particular rules and the speech production through the use of artificial intelligence in the context of those media. Thus, the aim of this paper is to outline the general features of the transformation in the normative vocabulary of Brandom’s communication model in order to achieve a better understanding of the phenomenon and to suggest possible consequences for discursive practice.

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