Forthcoming
Critical Notes

Non-Ideal Epistemology and the Silence on Oppression: On Robin McKenna's Non-Ideal Epistemology

Blas Radi
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina / Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Published 2025-06-23

Keywords

  • Epistemología social,
  • Idealización,
  • Ignorancia pública,
  • Problema lego/experto,
  • Cambio climático antropogénico
  • Social Epistemology,
  • Idealization,
  • Public Ignorance,
  • Layman-Expert Problem,
  • Anthropogenic Climate Change

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to assess Robin McKenna’s proposal of non-ideal epistemology, which he presents as the epistemological equivalent of Charles Mills’ non-ideal theory. To this end, I begin by reconstructing McKenna’s proposal. The reconstruction unfolds in three steps. First, I provide a general characterization, followed by an exploration of what the author considers to be the key aspects of his proposal, and finally, an instance of application. From there, I systematize a set of criticisms that question whether this proposal maintains a meaningful continuity with Mills’ non-ideal theory. Finally, I introduce the work of Heidi Grasswick, which provides a relevant point of contrast for the discussion on non-ideal epistemology.

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