Vol. 31 No. 2 (2011)
Articles

Modos de autoengaño y de razonamiento: teorías de proceso dual

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  • Salma Saab
Salma Saab
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2011.117

Published 2011-11-01

Keywords

  • Autoengaño,
  • Racionalidad,
  • Razonamiento,
  • Intencionalidad,
  • Teorías de proceso dual
  • Self-deception,
  • Rationality,
  • Reasoning,
  • Intentionality,
  • Dual process theories
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Abstract

In this paper I discuss the phenomenon of self-deception and its connection with the notion of rationality linked to the dual process theories. I present the intentionalist and nonintentionalist accounts of self-deception and aim to show how the debate between them can be resolved in a more comprehensive and satisfactory manner, if it is placed in the frame of the dual process theories. The dual model usually accepts two kinds of reasoning processes, heuristic and analytic, referred to two different systems, S1 and S2. These processes compete for control of our inferences and actions, but sometimes they interact and collaborate. It is suggested that in a dual model, the evaluations in terms of the rationality of the process will depend on the way in which self-deception participates in the reasoning process and on the system from which the evaluation takes place.

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