Forthcoming
Thematic section

Modal Naturalism, Laws of Nature, and the Asymmetries between Possibility and Necessity

PDF
  • Vassilis Livanios
Vassilis Livanios
University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1196

Published 2025-12-19

Keywords

  • Laws of Nature,
  • Naturalism,
  • Nomic Contingentism,
  • Modal Necessitarianism
  • Leyes de la naturaleza,
  • Naturalismo,
  • Contingentismo nómico,
  • Necesitarianismo modal
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Abstract

In their (2024), Bryant and Wilson present Modal Naturalism (MN) as an epistemology of objective modal facts which is based on the view that science is our primary source of evidence concerning those facts. They argue that modal naturalists should be nomic necessitarians because only in that way they can provide convincing examples of objective necessities in nature. In this paper, however, I argue that various cases of non-trivial counter-nomic reasoning in science strongly suggest that modal naturalists should accept objective counter-nomic possibilities that according to Wilson’s own view (2021) cannot be plausibly accommodated by nomic necessitarianism. Given that, nomic contingentism should be the favourite view of modal naturalists. In addition, I offer a MN-friendly definition of metaphysical possibility that minimises the evidential role of intuitions and so assuages the worry that nomic contingentism could bring back to the fore modal intuitions as sources of modal knowledge. Finally, I reply to the accusation that nomic contingentism raises (within the context of MN) epistemic asymmetries between possibilities and necessities by arguing that contingentist modal naturalists can provide knowledge of robust objective necessities but, on pain of refuting their own view, those necessities cannot be about fundamental nomic facts.

PDF

References

  1. Armstrong, D. (1983). What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press.
  2. Barrow, J., & Tipler, F. (1986). The anthropic cosmological principle. Clarendon Press.
  3. Bird, A. (2005). Unexpected a posteriori necessary laws of nature. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83(4), 533-548.
  4. Blackburn, S. (1993). Morals and modals. In Essays in quasi-realism (pp. 52-74). Oxford University Press.
  5. Bostock, S. (2003). Are all possible laws actual laws? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(4), 517-533.
  6. Bryant, A., & Wilson, A. (2024). Modal naturalism: Science and the modal facts. Cambridge University Press.
  7. Emery, N. (2023). Naturalism beyond the limits of science: How scientific methodology can and should shape philosophical theorizing. Oxford University Press.
  8. Fletcher, S. (2021). Modality in physics. In O. Bueno & S. Shalkowski (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of modality (pp. 251-264). Routledge,
  9. Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2009). Learning from minimal economic models. Erkenntnis, 70(1), 81-99.
  10. Handfield, T. (2004). Counterlegals and necessary laws. Philosophical Quarterly, 54(216), 402-419.
  11. Hawking, S. W. (1992). Chrononoly protection conjecture. Physical Review D, 46(2), 603-611.
  12. Hireche, S., Linnemann, N., Michels, R., & Vogt, L. (2021). The modal status of the laws of nature: Tahko’s hybrid view and the kinematical/dynamical distinction. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 11, 1-15.
  13. Kim, S. (2009). Counterlegals and the ‘makes no difference’ argument. Erkenntnis, 70(3), 419-426.
  14. Kimpton-Nye, S. (2020). Necessary laws and the problem of counterlegals. Philosophy of Science, 87(3), 518–35.
  15. Kimpton-Nye, S. (2022). Laws of nature: Necessary and contingent. The Philosophical Quarterly, 72(4), 875-895.
  16. Lehnert, R. (2011). Violations of Einstein’s relativity: Motivations, theory, and phenomenology. AIP Conference Proceedings, 1361, 30-43.
  17. Lewis, D. (1994). Humean supervenience debugged. Mind, 103(412), 473-491.
  18. Livanios, V. (2017). Science in metaphysics. Palgrave Macmillan
  19. Livanios, V. (2018). Hamilton’s principle and dispositional essentialism: Friends or foes? Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 49(1), 59-71.
  20. Livanios, V. (2019). Vikingism as a meta-metaphysical thesis. Metaphilosophy, 50(4), 516-535.
  21. Massimi, M. (2019). Two kinds of exploratory models. Philosophy of Science, 86(5), 869-881.
  22. Quine, W.V.O. (1976).Three grades of modal involvement. In The ways of paradox, and other essays (pp. 156-174). Harvard University Press.
  23. Rees, M. (1999). Just six numbers. Basic Books.
  24. Sidelle, A. (1989). Necessity, essence, and individuation: A defense of conventionalism. Cornell University Press.
  25. Tahko, T. E. (2015). The modal status of laws: In defence of a hybrid view. Philosophical Quarterly, 65(260), 509-528.
  26. Tan, P. (2019). Counterpossible non-vacuity in scientific practice. The Journal of Philosophy, 116(1), 32-60.
  27. Waters, K. (2017). No general structure. In M. H. Slater & Z. Yudell (Eds.), Metaphysics and the philosophy of science: New essays (pp. 81-108). Oxford University Press.
  28. Williamson, T. (2018). Spaces of possibility. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 82, 189- 204.
  29. Wilson, A. (2020). The nature of contingency: Quantum physics as modal realism.Oxford University Press.
  30. Wilson, A. (2021). Counter-possible reasoning in physics. Philosophy of Science, 88, 1113-1124.
  31. Wilson, A. (2024). Four grades of modal naturalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 124(2), 115-137.
  32. Wirling, Y. S., & Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2025). Through the prism of modal epistemology: Perspectives on modal modeling. In T. Knuutilla, T. Grüne-Yanoff, R. Koskinen & Y. S. Wirling (Eds.), Modeling the possible: Perspectives from Philosophy of Science (pp. 27-47). Routledge.
  33. Woodward, J. (2003). Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford University Press.