Vol. 30 No. 2 (2010)
Articles

Normatividad semántica y condiciones de corrección

Alfonso García Suárez
Universidad de Oviedo, España

Published 2010-11-01

Keywords

  • Significado,
  • Normatividad,
  • Evaluativo,
  • Deóntico,
  • Corrección
  • Meaning,
  • Normativity,
  • Evaluative,
  • Deontic,
  • Correction

Abstract

The thesis that meaning is normative has been given different formulations. After an examination of two kind of concepts by means of which it has been characterized, evaluative concepts and deontic concepts, the objections that Glüer, Boghossian, Hattiangadi and others have made to the possibility of stating it in terms of conditions of correction are discarded.

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