Causalidad, dependencia contrafáctica e influencia

Abstract

This paper offers a critical overview of Lewis' theory of singular causation running from his origins (1973a) to his last words on the issue (2000). In sections 1 and 2. I characterize Lewis' original theory of causation backed in terms of counterfactual dependence as opposed to regularity theories and also his two 1986a proposals of modification, prompted by cases of late preemption. In section 4, I examine the main problems of the 1986a proposals which lead Lewis to his last analysis of causation in terms of influence (2000). In section 5, I discuss the merits of Lewis last proposal as to the problems of late preemption and spurious causation. I also argue against Lewis' idea that his theory of influence can deal with trumping preemption cases. Besides, a general and severe problem of the overall counterfactual conception of causality is highlighted: the status of backtracking counterfactuals (section 3).