Published 2019-11-01
Keywords
- Responsabilidad penal,
- Odio,
- Motivos
- Criminal Responsibility,
- Hate,
- Motives
Abstract
In this paper, I suggest an answer to some well-known critics about how we should blame emotional motives. Particularly, whether if there is any justification to punish more severely crimes that are committed by certain motives or, by contrast, if that punishment is only a way to blame our guilty mind. Although my analysis is tightened to Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore’s arguments, I expect that the discussion would shed light on the main difficulties in evaluating emotional motives. Finally, I claim that the aggravating way of blaming emotional motives is justified when we understand the role played by motives in the determination of human action.
References
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Brax, D. (2016), “Motives, Reasons, and Responsibility in Hate/Bias Crime Legislation”, Criminal Justice Ethics, 35 (3), pp. 230-248.
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Duff, A. (1993), “Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability”, Law and Philosophy, 12 (4), pp. 345-383.
Elster, J. (2001), Sobre las pasiones: Emoción, adicción y conducta humana, Barcelona, Paidós.
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Fletcher, G. (2000), Rethinking Criminal Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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Horder J. (2004), Excusing Crime, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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Hurd, H. y Moore, M. (2011), “Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence”, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 5 (2), pp. 147-198.
Husak, D. (1989), “Motive and Criminal Liability”, Criminal Justice Ethics, 8 (1), pp. 3-14.
Husak, D. (2005), “A Liberal Theory of Excuses”, Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 3, pp. 287-299.
Jakobs, G. (2004), “Indiferencia como dolo indirecto”, en Zugaldía Espinar, J. M. y López Barja de Quiroga, J. (coords.) (2004), Dogmática y ley penal: Libro homenaje a Enrique Bacigalupo, Vol. 1, Madrid, Marcial Pons, pp. 345-358.
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Raz, J. (ed.) (1978), Practical Reasoning, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Redmayne, M. (2015), Character in the Criminal Trial, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Robinson, P. (2011), “Are We Responsible for Who We Are?: The Challenge for Criminal Law Theory in the Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination and ‘Rotten Social Background’”, Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review, 2, pp. 53-77.
Roxin, C. (1999), Derecho Penal: Parte General, Tomo I, Madrid, Civitas.
Sabini, J. y Silver, M. (1987), “Emotions, Responsibility and Character”, en Schoeman, F. D. (ed.) (1987), Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 165-178.
Sancinetti, M. (1986), Casos de derecho penal, Buenos Aires, Hammurabi.
Schmill, U. (2010), Las implicaturas del resentimiento: La tragedia de Otelo, México D. F., Themis.
Sistare, C. (1987), “Agent Motives and the Criminal Law”, Social Theory and Practice, 13 (3), pp. 305-326.
Strawson, P. (1995), Libertad y resentimiento, Barcelona, Paidós.
Tadros, V. (2013), “Wrongdoing and Motivation”, en Duff, R. A. y Green S. (eds.) (2013), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 206-227.
Von Liszt, F. (1905), “Die psychologischen Grundlagen der Kriminalpolitik”, en Von Liszt, F. (1905), Strafrechtliche Aufsätze und Vorträge, t. II, Berlín, pp. 170-213.
Von Wright, G. H. (1984), “Explanation and Understanding of Action”, en von Wright, G. H. (1984), Practical Reason: Philosophical Papers I, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 53-66.
Von Wright, G. H. (1998), In the Shadow of Descartes: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic.
Von Wright, G. H. (2003), “Valor, norma y acción”, Doxa, 26, pp. 53-79.
Williams, B. (1982), “Internal and External Reasons”, en Williams, B. (1982), Moral Luck, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 101-113.
Brax, D. (2016), “Motives, Reasons, and Responsibility in Hate/Bias Crime Legislation”, Criminal Justice Ethics, 35 (3), pp. 230-248.
Díaz López, J. A. (2013), El odio discriminatorio como agravante penal: Sentido y alcance del artículo 22.4 del Código Penal, Madrid, Civitas.
Duff, A. (1993), “Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability”, Law and Philosophy, 12 (4), pp. 345-383.
Elster, J. (2001), Sobre las pasiones: Emoción, adicción y conducta humana, Barcelona, Paidós.
Fletcher, G. (1992), En defensa propia, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch.
Fletcher, G. (2000), Rethinking Criminal Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Frankfurt, H. (1987), “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, en Schoeman, F. D. (ed.) (1999), Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 27-45.
Frankfurt, H. (2006), La importancia de lo que nos preocupa, Buenos Aires, Katz.
Gardner, J. (2007/2012), Ofensas y defensas: Ensayos selectos sobre filosofía del derecho penal, Madrid, Marcial Pons.
González Lagier, D. (2009a), Emociones, responsabilidad y Derecho, Barcelona, Marcial Pons.
González Lagier, D. (2009b), “Los presupuestos de la responsabilidad por nuestras emociones”, Doxa, 32, pp. 439-458.
Greenwald, A. y Krieger, L. H. (2006), “Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations”, California Law Review, 94 (4), pp. 945-967.
Horder J. (2004), Excusing Crime, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Hurd, H. M. (2014, julio), “The Innocence of Negligence”. Recuperado de SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2612084.
Hurd H. y Moore M. (2004), “Punishing Hatred and Prejudice”, Standford Law Review, 56 (5), pp. 1081-1146.
Hurd, H. y Moore, M. (2011), “Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence”, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 5 (2), pp. 147-198.
Husak, D. (1989), “Motive and Criminal Liability”, Criminal Justice Ethics, 8 (1), pp. 3-14.
Husak, D. (2005), “A Liberal Theory of Excuses”, Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 3, pp. 287-299.
Jakobs, G. (2004), “Indiferencia como dolo indirecto”, en Zugaldía Espinar, J. M. y López Barja de Quiroga, J. (coords.) (2004), Dogmática y ley penal: Libro homenaje a Enrique Bacigalupo, Vol. 1, Madrid, Marcial Pons, pp. 345-358.
Kahan, D. (2001), “Two Liberal Fallacies in the Hate Crime Debate”, Law and Philosophy, 20, pp. 175-193.
Kahan, D. y Nussbaum, M. (1996), “Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law”, Columbia Law Review, 96 (2), pp. 269-374.
Kindhäuser, U. (2005), “¿Indiferencia como dolo?”, Revista de Derecho, 6 (6), pp. 247-281.
Manrique, M. L. (2016), “Impulsos y razones en el derecho penal: Hacia una teoría dualista de las emociones”, Doxa, 39, pp. 289-304.
Mathis, S. (2018), “Motive, Action, and Confusions in the Debate over Hate Crime Legislation”, Criminal Justice Ethics, 37 (1), pp. 1-20.
Miró Linares, F. (dir.) (2017), Cometer delitos en 140 caracteres: El derecho penal ante el odio y la radicalización en Internet, Madrid, Marcial Pons.
Moore, M. (1997), Placing Blame, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Nino, C. S. (1987), Introducción a la filosofía de la acción, Buenos Aires, Eudeba.
Peralta, J. M. (2012), Motivos reprochables: Una investigación acerca de la relevancia de las motivaciones individuales para el derecho penal liberal, Madrid, Marcial Pons.
Peralta, J. M. (2013), “Homicidio por odio como delitos de sometimiento”, InDret, 4. Recuperado de http://www.indret.com/pdf/1005.pdf.
Pérez Barberá, G. (2011), El dolo eventual: Hacia el abandono de la idea de dolo como estado mental, Buenos Aires, Hammurabi.
Raz, J. (ed.) (1978), Practical Reasoning, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Redmayne, M. (2015), Character in the Criminal Trial, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Robinson, P. (2011), “Are We Responsible for Who We Are?: The Challenge for Criminal Law Theory in the Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination and ‘Rotten Social Background’”, Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review, 2, pp. 53-77.
Roxin, C. (1999), Derecho Penal: Parte General, Tomo I, Madrid, Civitas.
Sabini, J. y Silver, M. (1987), “Emotions, Responsibility and Character”, en Schoeman, F. D. (ed.) (1987), Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 165-178.
Sancinetti, M. (1986), Casos de derecho penal, Buenos Aires, Hammurabi.
Schmill, U. (2010), Las implicaturas del resentimiento: La tragedia de Otelo, México D. F., Themis.
Sistare, C. (1987), “Agent Motives and the Criminal Law”, Social Theory and Practice, 13 (3), pp. 305-326.
Strawson, P. (1995), Libertad y resentimiento, Barcelona, Paidós.
Tadros, V. (2013), “Wrongdoing and Motivation”, en Duff, R. A. y Green S. (eds.) (2013), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 206-227.
Von Liszt, F. (1905), “Die psychologischen Grundlagen der Kriminalpolitik”, en Von Liszt, F. (1905), Strafrechtliche Aufsätze und Vorträge, t. II, Berlín, pp. 170-213.
Von Wright, G. H. (1984), “Explanation and Understanding of Action”, en von Wright, G. H. (1984), Practical Reason: Philosophical Papers I, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 53-66.
Von Wright, G. H. (1998), In the Shadow of Descartes: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic.
Von Wright, G. H. (2003), “Valor, norma y acción”, Doxa, 26, pp. 53-79.
Williams, B. (1982), “Internal and External Reasons”, en Williams, B. (1982), Moral Luck, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 101-113.