Vol. 39 No. 2 (2019)
Critical Notes

Davidson after Davidson: The Present State of his ‘System’: On Mente y lenguaje. La filosofía de Davidson, modelo para armar, by Karina Pedace

Pablo Quintanilla
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

Published 2019-11-01

Keywords

  • Davidson,
  • Pedace,
  • Triangulación,
  • Significado
  • Davidson,
  • Pedace,
  • Triangulation,
  • Meaning

Abstract

The twenty years that have passed from late seventies to late nineties of last century, have noticed the influence of Donald Davidson’s thought in almost all areas of philosophy. Although the author himself didn´t attempt to build a system, the project that started with some technical annotations in formal semantics and action theory, became broader to progressively encompass intuitions in many more areas. Although the technical details of the project have received severe criticism, many of those intuitions are still valid. In this text I aim to review and discuss the central claims of Karina Pedace’s book, in order to assess those intuitions, regardless whether some of their critics have focused in details that might be of little relevance to understand the main objectives of the project.

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