Vol. 41 No. 1 (2021)
Articles

G. E. Moore on Concepts and Judgment

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  • José Sebastián Briceño Domínguez
José Sebastián Briceño Domínguez
Universidad de Santiago de Chile
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.357

Published 2021-05-01

Keywords

  • Conceptos,
  • Juicio,
  • Proposición,
  • Abstracto,
  • Particular,
  • Universal,
  • Substancia
    • ...More
    Less
  • Concepts,
  • Judgment,
  • Proposition,
  • Abstract,
  • Particular,
  • Universal,
  • Substance
    • ...More
    Less
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Abstract

In “The Nature of Judgment” (1899), G. E. Moore defends the strange thesis according to which “[i]t seems necessary… to regard the world as formed of concepts”. Philosophers have offered distinct understandings of this proposal, in particular of what Moorean concepts really are. In this article I discuss and reject three of them: one, according to which Moorean concepts are universals within the framework of a bundle theory of concrete particulars (Nelson, 1962; Baldwin, 1990); a second one, according to which Moorean concepts are particulars within a mereological framework of analysis (Bell, 1999); and a third one, according to which Moorean concepts are a sui generis category, resulting from his alleged rejection of the substance (particular)/attribute (universal) distinction (MacBride, 2018). I end by defending my own understanding, which highlights the openly Platonic stance of the young G. E. Moore.

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