Vol. 35 No. 2 (2015): Homenaje a Carlos S. Nino II
Articles

Punishment, Social Injustice and Moral Authority

Eduardo Rivera López
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

Published 2015-11-01

Keywords

  • Autoridad moral,
  • Castigo penal,
  • Teoría de la pena,
  • Carlos Nino,
  • Teoría disuasoria,
  • Retribucionismo
  • ...More
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  • Moral Authority,
  • Criminal Punishment,
  • Theory of Punishment,
  • Carlos Nino,
  • Deterrent Theory,
  • Retributionism
  • ...More
    Less

Abstract

 The question I address in this paper is whether social injustice can undermine the moral authority of society (and judges) to punish criminals. The answer to this question crucially depends on the underlying justificatory theory of punishment. I consider several theories, among them the consensual theory proposed by Carlos Nino. My aim is to explore how different theories of punishment address the challenge and to draw some tentative conclusions.

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