Vol. 42 No. 2 (2022)
Thematic section

Bringing Down Adoption Weight

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  • Ivan Vladimir Gavriloff
Ivan Vladimir Gavriloff
Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, San Miguel de Tucumán, Tucumán, Argentina / CONICET
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.388

Published 2022-11-11

Keywords

  • Adoption Problem,
  • Logical Principle,
  • Modus Ponens,
  • Practical Consequences
  • Problema de la Adopción,
  • Principio lógico,
  • Modus Ponens,
  • Consecuencias prácticas
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Abstract

In the present work, I bring down a condition to adopt a logical principle. This condition is regard to the propositional knowledge and instead is propose the beneficial practical effective consequences given the logical principle. To achive this first an adoption problem reconstruction as a reductio is given. Second, the beneficial practical effective consequences are introduced and how an agent can use them to adopt a logical principle. Lastly, objections are considered and a conclusion close the work.

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