The Adoption Problem and the Need to Differentiate Logic and Reasoning

Abstract

The adoption problem presented by Kripke and Padró argues that is not possible adopt new logical principles because to do it is mandatory reason with certain basics rules of reasoning, and if these basic rules are already in the reasoning there is not  necessary to adopt others. Following this idea, for reasoning is required have the  capacity of make use of basic principles. Kripke and Padró are supposing a limited case of reasoning, and they marked it as primitive. In opposition to this idea, I argue that there is no certainty that the reasoning has a similar structure to the basic rules of logic, because there are many ways to arrive to the same conclusion and there is no way to know which has been used. I maintain that does not exist a justification of the path followed in reasoning; therefore, the reasoning is not the object of study of logic. Following this argue, I show that the adoption problem has a true side, there are no way to adopt a logical principle, since the reasoning has not a similar structure  to any logic. Besides, it is possible to use many logics as models, those who can guide  the exchange of arguments.