Vol. 42 No. 1 (2022)
Thematic section

Application and Adoption of Logical Rules

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  • Camila Gallovich
Camila Gallovich
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.401

Published 2022-05-01

Keywords

  • Problema de la Adopción,
  • Aplicación canónica,
  • Anti-excepcionalismo,
  • Normatividad
  • Adoption Problem,
  • Canonical Application,
  • Anti-exceptionalism,
  • Normativity
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Abstract

Exceptionalism about logic assumes that logic has a privileged epistemological status, is normative, and cannot be revised. On the other hand, anti-exceptionalism rejects those particular traits. Recently, it has been suggested that the Adoption Problem of logical rules traverses the discussion between both positions. In this paper, I argue that that is not the case. In particular, I hold that if the Adoption Problem is a crucial threat to logic as a discipline, anti-exceptionalism about logic must be an incorrect position. Otherwise, exceptionalism about logic must be incorrect. In addition, I assess some consequences that follow from the previous analysis concerning the discussion on monism and pluralism about logic.

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