Vol. 42 No. 1 (2022)
Thematic section

What the Adoption Problem Does Not Show

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  • Camillo Giuliano Fiore
Camillo Giuliano Fiore
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.402

Published 2022-05-01

Keywords

  • Adoption Problem,
  • Anti-exceptionalism about Logic,
  • Revisability of Logic,
  • Logica utens
  • Problema de la Adopción,
  • Anti-excepcionalismo lógico,
  • Logica utens,
  • Revisabilidad de la Lógica
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Abstract

Saul Kripke proposed a skeptical challenge that Romina Padró defended and popularized by the name of the Adoption Problem. The challenge is that, given a certain definition of adoption, there are some logical principles that cannot be adopted—paradigmatic cases being Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens. Kripke has used the Adoption Problem to argue that there is an important sense in which logic is not revisable. In this essay, I defend two independent claims. First, that the Adoption Problem does not entail that logic is never revisable in the sense that Kripke addresses. Second, that, to assess whether an agent can revise their logic in the sense that Kripke addresses, it is best to consider a different definition of adoption, according to which Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens are sometimes adoptable.

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