Vol. 40 No. Especial (2020): Lógica, lenguaje y representación. Homenaje a Alberto Moretti
Articles

The Practices of Speaking, Naming and Interpreting: Remarks on Alberto Moretti´´'s Interpretationism

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  • Glenda Satne
Glenda Satne
University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.427

Published 2020-12-15

Keywords

  • Interpretation,
  • Speaker/Interpreter,
  • Naturalism,
  • Content,
  • Linguistic practice
  • Interpretación,
  • Hablante/Intérprete,
  • Naturalismo,
  • Contenido,
  • Práctica lingüística
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the notion of interpretation presented by Alberto Moretti in “La unidad proposicional” (and other texts) poses some philosophical and metaphilosophical problems. After presenting the key ideas that characterize the interpretative practice as Moretti describes it, I criticize its incompatibility with naturalism —one that understands interpretational practices in terms of natural capacities with phylogenetic and ontogenetic histories— and Moretti’s commitment to ineffabilism regarding the foundations of interpretative practices. I argue that if we abandon the idea that intentional capacities always involve conceptual content, a central commitment of Moretti’s interpretationist strategy, we can make room for a soft naturalistic understanding of interpretational capacities that is also pluralistic about the conditions for a practice to be linguistic and non-ineffabilist about its origins.

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