Vol. 40 No. Especial (2020): Lógica, lenguaje y representación. Homenaje a Alberto Moretti
Articles

Logics and Logicians: Conceptions of Logic

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  • Diego Letzen
Diego Letzen
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Córdoba, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.430

Published 2020-12-15

Keywords

  • Concepciones de la lógica,
  • Consecuencia lógica,
  • Razonamiento ordinario,
  • Principios lógicos
  • Conceptions of Logic,
  • Logical Consequence,
  • Commonsense Reasoning,
  • Logical Principles
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Abstract

In this paper I review various conceptions of logic. I study the scope and the limitations of the dominant conception in at least the first half of the XXth. century. I try to show the limitations of the notion associated with the concept of consequence captured by classical logical formalism, which is related to the program of the foundation of mathematics. Those limitations are pointed out not only with respect to the intuitive notions of logic but also with respect to the different associated disciplines (in particular computer sciences, psychology, cognitive sciences and the theory of argumentation). I argue that the characterization of logic offered by A. Moretti offers a broader and overcoming view of logic.

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