Vol. 41 No. 2 (2021)
Thematic section

Why a Logic is not only its Set of Valid Inferences

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  • Eduardo A. Barrio,
  • Federico Pailos
Eduardo A. Barrio
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Argentina
Federico Pailos
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.461

Published 2021-11-01

Keywords

  • Lógicas subestructurales,
  • Transitividad,
  • Lógica clásica,
  • Metainferencias
  • Classical Logic,
  • Metainferences,
  • Substructural Logics,
  • Transitivity
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Abstract

The main idea that we want to defend in this paper is that the question of what a logic is should be addressed differently when structural properties enter the game. In particular, we want to support the idea according to which it is not enough to identify the set of valid inferences to characterize a logic. In other words, we will argue that two logical theories could identify the same set of validities (e.g. its logical truths and valid inferences), but not be the same logic.

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