Vol. 35 No. 1 (2015): Homenaje a Carlos S. Nino I
Articles

Nino and Dworkin on the Concepts of Law

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  • J.J. Moreso
J.J. Moreso
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2015.50

Published 2018-02-19

Keywords

  • Carlos S. Nino,
  • Ronald Dworkin,
  • Concept of law,
  • Conceptual Pluralism
  • Carlos S. Nino,
  • Ronald Dworkin,
  • Concepto de derecho,
  • Pluralismo conceptual
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Abstract

Some of the most relevant legal philosophers in the last decades, as Carlos S. Nino and Ronald Dworkin, have defended the idea that there is a plurality of concepts of law. Scott Shapiro has sustained this account in a particularly relevant way: the word ‘law’ displays a ubiquitous ambiguity, sometimes designates a set of norms and other a social organization. This is precisely the thesis which is criticized in the paper. It is argued, from a certain philosophical literature about the concepts, that concepts of social objects of intentional character (as it is the case for law, but also for literary works for example) contain a social dimension and a meaning dimension, normative in the case of the law. That is to say, the concept of law expresses a social dimension and a normative dimension intertwined.

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