Vol. 34 No. 2 (2014)
Critical Notes

Mind, Reason and Being-in-the-world: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate

  • Manuel Heras Escribano
Manuel Heras Escribano
Departamento de Filosofía I, Universidad de Granada, España
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2014.55

Published 2014-11-01

Keywords

  • Rationality,
  • Perception,
  • Content,
  • Dreyfus,
  • McDowell
  • Racionalidad,
  • Percepción,
  • Contenido,
  • Dreyfus,
  • McDowell
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Abstract

The following paper provides a critical analysis of the volume Mind, Reason and Beingin-the-world: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, edited by Josep K. Schear (2013). First I offer a brief introduction to the philosophical proposals of both authors in order to account for perception and its relation to rationality. After that, I will evaluate the two arguments of Dreyfus (expertise and the merging argument) against McDowell's main thesis by which there is no gap between experience and reason. Also, I will pay special attention to the different notions of perceptual content and epistemic access that both authors endorse.

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