Vol. 10 No. 1 (1990)
Articles

Acerca de la teoría del sentir de F. H. Bradley

Pablo S. García
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

Published 1990-05-01

How to Cite

García, P. S. (1990). Acerca de la teoría del sentir de F. H. Bradley. Análisis Filosófico, 10(1), 89–94. Retrieved from https://analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/article/view/733

Abstract

In this paper the theory of “feeling” that F. H. Bradley develops in the chapter VI of his *Essays on Truth and Reality* is exposed, pointing some examples of the influence of Hegelian thought (specially the notions of *Aufhebung* and “natural soul”). Bradley says that there is a pre-conscious level of experience called by him “feeling” or “inmediate experience”. There are two main assertions in his theory: (i) consciousness cannot produce the impressions it is aware of, and (ii) there is a pre-conscious level of experience in which there is no distinction between subject and object. Some observations are made about these two assertions.