Vol. 32 No. 2 (2012)
Articles

Wittgenstein y la intencionalidad de lo mental

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  • Juan José Acero,
  • Neftalí Villanueva
Juan José Acero
Universidad de Granada, Departamento de Filosofía I
Neftalí Villanueva
Universidad de Granada, Departamento de Filosofía I
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2012.98

Published 2012-11-01

Keywords

  • Lenguaje,
  • Pensamiento,
  • Intencionalidad,
  • Inocencia semántica,
  • Expresivismo
  • Language,
  • Thought,
  • Intentionality,
  • Semantic innocence,
  • Expressivism
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Abstract

In Philosophical Investigations and other postractarian writings Wittgenstein rejected the view of mind that holds Brentano's Thesis. The rejection, specifically addressed against the claim that thoughts depict reality by containing representations that agree with it, denounces a grammatical confusion, that the objects to which thoughts would point to are shadows projected by our language's grammar. Interpreters such us Hacker and Glock have pointed out that that confusion is mainly due to the effects of applying the analysis of non-psychological transitive sentences to the analysis of sentences that ascribe thoughts to agents. In this paper a much more complex view of Wittgenstein's resources to reject Brentano's Thesis is put forward. It is also argued that in his amended explanation of intentionality a number of requirements play a decisive rôle, namely those of semantic innocence, expressivism, systematiticity and the view of language as a vehicle of thought, that have been ignored up to now.

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