Vol. 32 No. 2 (2012)
Articles

La explicación reductiva de los estados de cosas y el regreso de Bradley

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  • José Tomás Alvarado Marambio
José Tomás Alvarado Marambio
Pontificia Universidad Catóilca de Chile
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2012.99

Published 2012-11-01

Keywords

  • Regreso de Bradley,
  • Estados de cosas,
  • Tropos,
  • Particulares,
  • Propiedades
  • Bradley's Regress,
  • States of Affairs,
  • Tropes,
  • Particulars,
  • Properties
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Abstract

This work presents a —possible— solution to the so-called 'Bradley's Regress'. It is claimed, first, that the regress should be seen as a problem that appears when one is trying to explain reductively states of affairs, that is, when one is trying to reduce states of affairs to its components. The recent proposal of Gaskin (2008) is, then, discussed. Gaskin sustains that the fact that the regress is infinite might turn it into a proper reductive explanation of states of affairs. It is argued, though, that the infinite instantiation relations postulated by Gaskin are not apt to give the reductive explanation sought. Finally, it is contended that tropes, in various of the forms by which they have been proposed may give the required reductive explanation of states of affairs. Tropes have, further, an important systematic advantage over the usual strategies used to defuse the regress, for tropes do not appear as an 'exception' or as mysterious 'primitives' in the general ontological landscape.

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