Vol. 32 Núm. 1 (2012)
Simposio

Anti-Realism and Infinitary Proofs

Diego Tajer
Universidad de Buenos Aires / CONICET

Publicado 2012-05-01

Palabras clave

  • Anti-realismo,
  • Realismo,
  • Lógica infinitaria
  • Anti-realism,
  • Realism,
  • Infinitary logic

Resumen

En la discusión sobre la Paradoja de Yablo, un tópico debatido es el estatus de las pruebas infinitarias. Se suele considerar que, aunque un realista podría (con cierto esfuerzo) aceptarlas, un anti-realista no podría hacerlo en absoluto. En este artículo, argumento que hay razones plausibles para que un anti-realista acepte pruebas y reglas de inferencia infinitarias

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