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Acerca de una interpretación Bohmiana estructural sin fundamentalidad respecto al espacio

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  • Jorge Manero
Jorge Manero
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City, Mexico.
Biografía
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1151

Publicado 2026-01-07

Palabras clave

  • Metafísica de la mecánica cuántica,
  • Teoría Bohmiana,
  • Realismo estructural,
  • Subdeterminación,
  • Teoría de grupos de Lie
  • Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics,
  • Bohm’s Theory,
  • Structural Realism,
  • Underdetermination,
  • Lie Group Theory
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Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

En los últimos años se ha desarrollado un polémico debate respecto a la elección entre las muchas interpretaciones de la mecánica cuántica disponibles en la literatura. Con base en ciertos criterios realistas, este debate se ha abordado en el contexto de la elección entre dos visiones opuestas sobre el espacio matemático en el que vive la ontología fundamental de esta teoría. En efecto, varios académicos han defendido una visión en la que esta ontología vive en un espacio abstracto de alta dimensión, mientras que otros abogan por una visión tridimensional, según la cual la ontología vive en el espacio físico de nuestra experiencia cotidiana. En esta contribución, evaluaré críticamente la posibilidad de resolver la subdeterminación resultante entre la visión tridimensional y la de alta dimensión en el contexto de una teoría cuántica particular: el enfoque Bohmiano. Al hacerlo, seguiré dos estrategias: en primer lugar, socavaré la suposición de que un conjunto de virtudes teóricas o metafísicas bloquea el problema de la subdeterminación asociado con el espacio matemático en el que vive la ontología bohmiana fundamental; y en segundo lugar, propondré una interpretación Bohmiana estructural mediante el uso de simetrías dinámicas (grupos de Lie simplécticos), según la cual la distinción entre el espacio tridimensional y el de alta dimensión es solo aparente, ya que ambos espacios dependen fundamentalmente de la misma estructura dinámica.

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Citas

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