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Dos tipos de naturalismo y la metafísica de la ciencia

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  • Nina Emery
Nina Emery
Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Massachusetts, United States.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1165

Publicado 2026-02-06

Palabras clave

  • Metafísica,
  • Ciencia,
  • Naturalismo
  • Metaphysics,
  • Science,
  • Naturalism
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

La metafísica de la ciencia es una subdisciplina de la filosofía que busca responder preguntas metafísicas —preguntas sobre cómo es el mundo— de una manera informada por nuestra mejor ciencia. Pero, ¿informada cómo, exactamente? A continuación, detallaré dos formas importantes en las que podríamos hacer más precisa la relación entre metafísica y ciencia. Más específicamente, detallaré dos tipos diferentes de naturalismo a los que un metafísico podría suscribirse. Luego argumentaré que estos dos tipos diferentes de naturalismo están relacionados de manera importante, y que una vez que se aprecia esta relación, tiene implicaciones no solo sobre cómo abordamos debates metafísicos particulares, sino también sobre cómo pensamos el alcance de la metafísica de la ciencia en general.

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Citas

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